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Abstract 
Currently there is limited security offered in the Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI) systems. Due to the growth of global market, Electronic Data Inter-
change is becoming an important tool for improving business prospects and 
hence becoming a target for fraud and misuse of information. This thesis 
at tempts to provide security enhancements in the EDI systems. A model of 
the EDI system, the Direct Store Delivery System is described with security 
features added for global use. The model uses a Third Party Service Provider 
providing Message Handling Systems for communication between the trading 
partners. This thesis describes the security enhancement in the EDI messages 
using the UN/EDIFACT standard of formatting the EDI messages with the 
inclusion of certificates, digital signatures in the messages without changing 
the syntax of the EDI message. Also, a proposal to use X.500 Directory Ser-
vices standards for global authentication is described along with other network 
security services. All these security services are included in the Application 
layer of the OSI reference model and are transparent to the user. As a result 
of the proposal, the security services can be implemented on a global ba^is as 
a step towards an open-edi system. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the basic issues of network security, 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and EDI security. 
1.1 Introduction 
During the 1990s, there has been a significant rise in the commercial use of 
computer networks. Their implications and effectiveness in business have been 
felt worldwide, allowing organizations to eliminate "... barriers of geography 
and time on service and co-ordination^^ [48] and "... reach out beyond the 
boundaries of the organization to the premises of the customers, suppliers, 
government agencies and others"These telecommunication capabilities 
have provided business with increased potential and ease of global trade by 
bringing fundamental changes in the organizational procedures. The growing 
number of electronic linkages between traders has produced dramatic effects 
on the inter-organizational relationships and industry structure. 
Industries, as well as government agencies view Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI) as the emerging technology to support this growth. EDI is often viewed 
as a way of replacing the traditional paper documents (e.g. purchase order 
forms, shipping forms, invoices, financial documents etc.) with electronic ones, 
and replacing conventional methods of transmitting such documents (e.g. mail, 
telephone, facsimile, courier etc.) with electronic transmissions. EDI, however, 
can also replace manual data entry with electronic data entry (by providing 
a Universal Product Code) and can also provide a platform for effective busi-
ness re-engineering. To ensure the inter-operatability between the various EDI 
systems, they should be independent of any particular hardware or software. 
In addition, the EDI messages should be conveyed in a structured format. 
Thus, the primary purpose of EDI, is to provide communication standards 
that promote the interchange of common business information to facilitate the 
electronic linkages, without human intervention. 
EDI systems have been successfully implemented, often involving multiple 
business functions (such as shipping and billing), in a number of industries 
(such as automobile, insurance, groceries etc.). There are obvious advantages 
in implementing EDI in terms of speed, accuracy and flexibility. However, a 
major concern embedded in the use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is 
the ever greater need to protect the information from misuse. Security and 
privacy have become prominent issues in those public and private sectors which 
use Electronic Data Interchange. They all rely on communication networks for 
communicating sensitive, commercial, financial and personal information. As 
the communication networks are not secure, it is therefore necessary to protect 
their valuable information-both within the communication networks and within 
the information processors connected to the network. If these concerns are not 
properly resolved, they threaten to limit the full potential of networking, in 
terms of both participation and usefulness. 
1.2 Network Security Issues 
The use of EDI requires formatting the data in a structured manner and also 
requires communication networks for transmitting these EDI messages. The 
users of EDI have the same expectations as users of conventional computer 
systems. They expect accurate delivery of messages; protection from loss; 
modification or observation of messages; and reliable service. These are the 
network equivalents of integrity, secrecy and availability. However, several 
security problems are inherent in the network access and its use. 
1.2.1 Problems in Network Security 
In today's environment, networking offers the advantage of sharing important 
information among the authorized personnel, both inside and outside the or-
ganization and cost effectiveness in implementing a network solution. Pfleeger 
28] has discussed some reasons for security problems in networks. 
Sharing 
Due to resources and workload sharing of networks, a greater number of users 
have the potential to access networked systems than single computers. Since 
the access is afforded for many systems, the access controls for a single system 
is inadequate networked environments. 
Complexity of the System 
A network combines two or more possibly dissimilar operating systems with 
mechanisms for interhost connection. Therefore, a network operating system 
or control system is likely to be more complex than an operating system for a 
single computing system. This complexity deters the certification or confidence 
in the security of a network. 
Many Points of Attack 
A single computing system is a self contained unit. Access controls on one 
machine preserves the secrecy of its data. However, when a file is stored in 
a network host remote from that user, the file may pass through several host 
machines to get to the user. The administrator of one machine may enforce 
rigorous security policies, but that administrator does not have any control 
over the other hosts in a network. Thus the user in a networked system has 
to trust the access control mechanisms of all these systems. 
Unknown Perimeter in a Network 
The expandibility of a network also implies uncertainty about the network 
boundary. One host may be a node on two different networks so that the re-
sources on one network are accessible to the users of the other network as well. 
Although wide acceptability is an advantage, this unknown and uncontrolled 
group of potentially malicious users is a security disadvantage. A similar prob-
lem occurs when new hosts are added to a network. Every network node must 
be able to react to the presence of new, and possibly untrustworthy hosts. 
1.2.2 Network Security 
Since more and more information is conveyed through a computer network, 
one of the issues concerning security involves protecting information as it is 
transmitted through the network. There are three major trends leading to an 
urgent reassessment and causing the escalation of concerns in communications 
security [20]. These are : -
• the increasing interconnection of systems and of networks, making any 
system potentially accessible to a rapidly growing population of known 
and unknown users; 
• The increasing use of computer networks for security-sensitive informa-
tion e.g. EFT, business data interchange, unclassified but sensitive gov-
ernment information and corporate proprietary information; and 
• The increasing ease of engineering a network attack, given the ready 
availability of increasingly sophisticated technology and the rapidly falling 
costs of such technology to a would-be attacker. 
There are many potential types of attacks on commercial or unclassified gov-
ernment networks. They include financial frauds, theft of telecommunication 
resources, industrial espionage, illicit eavesdropping for financial or political 
gain and malicious attacks by intruders. In addition to countering all these 
attacks the communication's security needs to protect data against accidental 
exposures. The accidental connection of a sensitive communication session to 
the wrong address or the accidental failure to properly protect sensitive infor-
mation may prove as damaging as a successful deliberate attack. As an EDI 
system often transmits commercial or financial data through networks, this 
information needs to be protected against network security threats in general. 
f. 
1.3 Need for EDI Security 
The growth of EDI started in small closed user groups, where the trading 
partners knew and trusted each other. The data being transferred was not 
very critical in context (e.g. purchase orders which are not usually subject to 
fraudulent use). As organizations began to rise along the EDI learning curve 
they began to understand that the real benefits from EDI results from being 
able to restructure the existing business processes. EDI provides simplification 
and improvement of existing business processes and matches them with those 
of the trading partners. As the technology goes towards an open-EDI, where 
orders might be accepted from a company with which no trading relation-
ship exists at this time, the security and audit policies must also be upgraded 
to match this new technology. Nowadays, EDI is increasingly being used for 
financial transactions and greater security is required in a financial transaction. 
Electronic security systems such as Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) 
and Society Worldwide for Interbank Financial Transfer (SWIFT) have been 
around for some years transferring money to and from banks and providing 
basic security services for their operation. However, Cobb [31] identifies two 
major differences between the requirements of Electronic Data Interchange and 
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFTs): 
• Existing EFTs are operated and managed by a single enterprise or by a 
clearly defined closed user groups. EDI, on the other hand, involves mul-
tiple independent parties, transferring many different types of transac-
tions between each other. The identification and status of the originator 
of an EDI transaction will not always be known to the recipient of that 
transactit)n. 
Most EFTs today are operated on private networks with restricted ac-
cess. EDI, however, uses store and forward services from multiple service 
providers. This means that data will be in escrow^ during some part of 
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its transmission, which is outside the direct control of the originator or 
recipient. 
The aim and scope of this thesis is based on the security issues in the Electronic 
Data Interchange involving multiple trading partners connected via a Value 
Added Network Service (VAN). 
1.4 Aim of the Thesis 
EDI transactions can be divided into two distinct generic activities. The pri-
mary activity is the creation of a EDI document from internal data. This 
requires in-house interface software to translate the outgoing messages from 
(possibly) unstructured, company or application specific formats into the EDI 
document translation format, e.g. ANSI X12, UN/EDIFACT, and placing 
the resulting universal documents into an electronic outgoing message with 
the proper security headers and trailers inserted in the message format. The 
second activity is the transmission of the standardized EDI document to its 
recipient. This requires telecommunication software which transmits the now 
structured message to its internal/external recipient typically using data com-
munication standards as defined in the OSI Reference Model. 
The main aim of this thesis is to provide security enhancements in the ex-
isting EDI systems. This includes providing security enhancements in the EDI 
messages using, the UN/EDIFACT standards to structure the data and in the 
communication networks while transmitting the EDI messages. 
The current implementations of telecommunication networks for private 
users require an increasing awareness of network security issues. Within a 
single management domain, where all the processing nodes and network links 
are under the control of the same administration, security is not such a criti-
cal issue. However, when the management association takes place across the 
boundary between two separate management domains, and makes use of the 
public data networks, security issues should be considered in greater detail. 
The proposals to counter network security threats are described using the 
X.400 Message Handling Systems and X.500 Directory Services standards. 
1.5 Scope of the Thesis 
This thesis presents the background on the communication and security as-
pects of Electronic Data Interchange. It discusses the security threats in EDI 
and the need to enhance the security of the present day EDI systems to sup-
port the future trend of open-EDI systems. Finally it proposes a model of an 
EDI system, the Direct Store Delivery System to incorporate security services 
such as authentication; non-repudiation; authorization; delegation and access 
control which are necessary to ensure secure and smooth operation of the EDI 
system. 
In chapter 2, an overview of EDI is presented along with the specific advan-
tages and means of implementing EDI in an organization. Also, Value Added 
Network Services (VANS) used to transmit EDI messages in a store and for-
ward manner, are described with their advantages. 
In chapter 3, the security issues related to EDI are discussed and evalu-
ation of the threats posed to the EDI system. Some security issues such as 
cross-vulnerability; multiplicity of standards and password guessing attacks 
are highlighted. 
In chapter 4, the X.400 and X.500 secure message handling systems stan-
dards are explained. The main security services provided by the standards are 
discussed and their use in the proposed model to provide the security enhance-
ment to the EDI system is described. 
In chapter 5, the Direct Store Delivery System, a model of the EDI system 
is proposed. The model is based on the Just-In-Time (JIT) principle of inven-
tory management. 
In chapter 6, the security services provided in an UN/EDIFACT standard 
of EDI messages are described along with the security enhancement provided 
in the standard. In particular, the inclusion of digital signatures, certificates 
for authentication of origin, message integrity in the messages itself without 
changing the syntax of the message are discussed. 
In chapter 7, the basic security services needed to ensure the smooth op-
eration of the proposed system are described. The authentication protocol 
based on the X.509 standards is presented. Other security services such as 
user identification; non-repudiation and responsibility are also discussed. 
Finally in chapter 8, the solutions given in the proposed model of EDI are 
discussed and suggestions for further research work are proposed. 
In Appendix A, the paper titled "Direct Store Delivery System" is pre-
sented. 
Chapter 2 
Electronic Data Interchange 
System 
This chapter presents an overview on Electronic Data Interchange systems. 
The basic concepts of Electronic Data Interchange and its advantages are de-
scribed. In addition, the benefits of using Value Added Network Service in an 
EDI system are described for communication between trading partners. 
2.1 Basic Elements of Electronic Data Inter-
change 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is the movement of business data electroni-
cally within or between firms in a structured, computer processable data format 
that permits data to be transferred without rekeying from an application in one 
location to an application in another location [23]. In the traditional paper-
based flow of information, manual data entry is performed at each step in the 
process. In addition, a comparison of purchase orders, receiving of notices and 
invoices are also required to be done manually. This contributes to the higher 
EDI format service 
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Communications Service 
EDI format service 
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Figure 2.1: Basic Elements in EDI 
cost of transaction processing and the continued involvement of the end user in 
the overall process. These two manual processes are eliminated with the sub-
stitution of electronic methods such as EDI. In an EDI system the computer 
transfer can be direct, with two companies using an agreed data protocol, or it 
can be performed using a third party service provider. Users can communicate 
business documents such as purchase orders, price quotes, shipping notices or 
even payment orders, electronic funds transfer to customers and suppliers. The 
format in EDI is governed by a set of standards. Essentially an EDI system 
comprises four basic elements as shown in figure 2.1. These are: 
2.1.1 Application to Application Process 
EDI is a direct application to application communication as opposed to com-
puter to computer communication. At the simplest level, one (the sender) 
application generates information which is processed by a second (the recipi-
ent) application. An important distinguishing characteristic of EDI systems is 
that the two applications are geographically distant. The EDI system requires 
the data to be in a highly structured format according to the EDI standards. 
2.1.2 Standards 
The use of structured, formatted messages based upon internationally agreed 
standards are necessary in an EDI because they enable messages to be trans-
lated, interpreted and checked for compliance to a standard set of rules. It re-
quires a set of procedures (and protocols) for converting the information from 
the native format generated by the sender application into a previously agreed 
standardized format (e.g. ANSI X12, EDIFACT, etc.) for interchange. The 
recipient application has access to a corresponding set of translation services 
which convert the information from the standardized format to the required 
native format. Often they are processed in batches, or they can be handled di-
rectly in real time. This allows companies to enquire directly on their trading 
partner's system (where authorized) for information such as price, availability, 
order status etc. 
2.1.3 Translation Software 
The EDI translational software links the application and the communications 
software and makes the EDI process functional. This software allows for the 
translation of data from a company's internal format to the industry specific 
format. EDI translation software has two primary functions. For outgoing 
data, the software reformats the electronic data into the public or industry 
standard used by the receiving partner. For incoming data, the software re-
formats the EDI data into the format required by the internal application 
and performs edit checks. EDI translation software typically consists of a 
communication link and an application interface. The communications link is 
responsible for sending and receiving teleprocessing commands along the net-
work that connects the trading partners and the third party service providers. 
The application interface controls the sending and receiving of EDI messages, 
or transactions, to and from the document database. 
2.1.4 Communication Networks 
The telecommunications hardware and software are the components that cre-
ate the link between the trading partners and provide the partners with the 
capability to send and receive EDI transaction sets. The use of electronic 
mailboxes for "store and collect/store and forward" transmission/delivery of 
documents is provided by the third party network service provider. Thus it 
requires a set of procedures (and protocols) for packaging the information gen-
erated by the previous (information format conversion) phase into the format 
required by the communication network service used to transport the infor-
mation between the communicating applications. Telecommunication software 
controls the actual transmission of EDI messages. Features of this software can 
include automatic dialing, management and maintenance of trading partners 
addresses and activity logging. 
The aims of EDI will only be realized if the EDI systems incorporate appro-
priate communication mechanisms. The requirements for such communication 
systems include: 
• The communication should be independent of machine, media and the 
end system allowing trading partners to operate within their own com-
puting strategies without being restricted by the EDI systems; 
• The communication system does not affect existing data processing ap-
plications; 
• The EDI messages should not be affected by the use of a particular 
communications protocol; 
• The communication must handle messages of the format used by EDI, or 
that of a general purpose communication system which can handle any 
format of the message being used; 
• The communication must provide services that are required by the pro-
cesses that are inter-working to provide EDI. These services include def-
initions of what happens if the EDI message cannot be delivered. 
Thus the term Electronic Data Interchange does not refer to: 
• Electronic mail: Like Electronic Data Interchange, electronic mail also 
moves business data electronically, but generally uses a free rather than a 
structured format. Since the sender may choose any format, it is difficult 
to design an apphcation program that would directly accept electronic 
mail input without significant manual editing. 
• Facsimile Transmission : Facsimile transmission represents the transfer 
of totally unstructured data. Data in almost any format, from pho-
tographs to purchase orders, may be sent by this means. In facsimile 
transmission, a digitized image is formed of the message and the image 
is transrnitted to the receiver. The receiver of the facsimile transmission 
would not be able to enter the image directly into a business applica-
tion without manually keying in the printed image or at best editing the 
character file by some means. 
• File Transfer : This application also makes little use of standard formats 
which need not have any connection with applications at either end of 
transmission. 
In the next section the benefits offered by the use of Electronic Data Inter-
change in an organization are examined. 
2.2 Benefits of EDI 
The use of EDI is increasing on a global scale. The efficiency and cost-saving 
aspects of EDI form a strong basis for its growing popularity in the world 
of electronic transactions. Major organizations have been at the forefront of 
EDI, and smaller entities are aligning themselves along the "paperless" path of 
business transaction and communication. Although the case for an EDI differ 
between companies, several key reasons such as improved customer service; 
reduced operating costs and responsiveness to market demands continually 
re-occur. The key benefits which result from the employment of EDI in an 
organization include : -
2.2.1 Improved Productivity 
There is improved productivity using EDI with the reduction in paper flow and 
support for just-in-time inventories. The benefits normally associated with 
the reduction in paper work in an EDI environment include personnel savings, 
better data quality and improved customer service. In addition, savings may 
be attributed to the reduction or elimination of data entry requirements. The 
electronic transfer of business documents improves data quality by minimizing 
potential misinterpretation resulting in an error in data quality. EDI improves 
customer service by compressing the inherent time delays in the value added 
chain, thus greatly reducing the possibility of lost or missing information. 
2.2.2 Competit ive Advantage 
In a highly competitive market, the ability to offer significant cuts in product 
delivery time may be the difference between winning and losing a contract. 
This is particularly relevant to international trade, where the movement of 
paperwork can lag behind the associated movement of goods, resulting in goods 
being tied up in port waiting for clearance. The net effect is increased cost to 
the carrier, which filters through into increased cost to the customer. 
2.2.3 Reduced Financial Exposure 
With the use of EDI, the financial exposure risks are reduced thereby mak-
ing cash management more efficient. Commercial risks may be contained by 
developing fewer but stronger supplier relationships. When the barriers to 
inter-organizational communication are greatly reduced, the quality of the re-
lationship should improve. EDI enables suppliers to send accurate and timely 
invoices. Customers report vast improvements in matching invoices with pur-
chase orders and deliveries, and a reduction in the number of errors and queries. 
The net result is that a high proportion of invoices are on time. 
2.3 Who Should Use EDI ? 
The use of EDI is steadily growing across all industries. One of the driving 
forces behind the implementation of EDI is the external pressure from cus-
tomers. Companies fear losing their business advantage if they do not imple-
ment EDI in their organization. The potential organizations that may require 
to implement EDI include those who 
• Handle large volumes of repetitive standard transactions which is an 
important factor in transportation and groceries industries. 
• Operate on a very tight margin. 
• Face stiff competition, requiring significant productivity improvements. 
• Operate on a time-sensitive environment. 
• Have received requests to convert to EDI from trading partners. 
2.4 Implementing EDI 
Pugsley [44] has defined six steps to successfully implement EDI technology in 
an organization: 
• Complete understanding of EDI : The depth of knowledge a company 
acquires on EDI depends on the internal efforts spent. If no external 
consultants are hired then the level of knowledge should be high. One 
method to gain knowledge is to join one of the groups developing stan-
dards. (e.g. EDI Council of Australia) 
• Agreed on standards with business partners : After finding a suitable busi-
ness partner, agreements should be made concerning standards, transac-
tions to be exchanged, message syntax, file transfer protocol etc. 
• Modifying existing systems : The host computer applications should be 
modified so that EDI information is incorporated or integrated directly 
into the applications. Good EDI software should provide an application 
interface to many different applications. 
• Translate data : Various translation modules are required to translate 
transactions into EDI messages according to the EDI standard being 
used. The translation is required of the data into the EDI format as well 
as translation of data from an EDI package into a format compatible 
with the in-house application. 
• Prepare communications : A network connection to various trading part-
ners is required via either a Value Added Network (VAN) or direct con-
nection. 
• Management and audit of the whole process : Consistent management 
and auditing of the entire process must be established and maintained. 
The tasks include archiving transactions, inspecting error logs and en-
suring security of the system. 
Direct computer-to-computer communications with a trading partner requires 
that both firms use similar communication protocols; have the same transmis-
sion speed; have telephone lines available at the same time and have compatible 
computer hardware. If these conditions are not met, communication becomes 
difficult, if not impossible. A Value- Added Network (VAN) can solve these 
problems by providing services that enhance the basic telecommunication net-
work. 
2.5 Value Added Network (VAN) 
f-
A VAN, at the simplest level, provides point-to-point packet switching. At a 
more advanced level it may also offer protocol conversion to support a wide 
range of different equipment. A comprehensive VAN is likely to have the fol-
lowing general components - basic network, generic services, transaction relay, 
application enabling, information databases and network management. It will 
also provide a two-way link that enables users to rapidly exchange records 
or specific fields of an EDI message rather than the whole message, but it is 
more commonly used as a store and forward service that employs electronic 
mailboxes to which messages are sent. By using VAN services, a company 
can trade electronically with many trading partners and yet only need to meet 
one set of EDI communications requirements - those determined by the user's 
chosen VAN. 
The commonly available VAN service providers are GEIS EDI exchanges, 
IBM's Information Exchange EDI Service, British Telecom's EDI*Net service. 
2.5.1 Benefits of VAN 
Generally trading partners do not operate in the same computer environment 
nor use the same data format. VANs put order into this EDI world by perform-
ing conversions between diff"erent trading partner environments, thus enabling 
many trading partners to work as a single user community. The additional 
benefits obtained in using a VAN are: 
• A direct communication link to any trading partner 
• VAN service providers' experience and knowledge of the existing EDI 
standards and evolving EDI technologies; 
• A v a n ' S ability to support multiple data format standards; 
• VAN mailbox services, a store and forward system of messaging; 
• 24 hour services; and 
• VAN'S ability to provide tracking and control information, with which 
users audit document and message transmission between partners. 
2.6 Existing Third Party Service Providers 
There are number of Third Party Service Providers available which offer value 
added services to the customers. The basic security service provided is through 
the use of passwords. 
In Trada-Net, there is high physical security. Access to the system is 
through passwords which are changed daily. However, the messages can only 
be sent through the service after prior agreement of both the trading partners 
for exchange of particular data type. There are audit trails for the complete 
transactions and the third party also offers facility of doing trading defined in 
a closed user group. 
The world's largest EDI third party service provider is GEIS. It provides 
physical safeguards to the incoming lines. In addition, distribution to different 
lines is done via two levels of random access devices before the messages are 
routed out to the leased lines (i.e. message bit stream is also split). It also 
provides added security functions such as an option for a secondary password 
and requirement of session code when transferring funds. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter outlined the basic concepts of an EDI, its advantages and the 
benefits to improving business relationships. Since EDI involves paperless 
transactions, there is greater need to prove that the transactions are authentic 
and they must be protected against misuse and fraud. In the next chapter the 
security threats that are inherent in an EDI system are discussed. 
Chapter 3 
Security Issues in EDI 
A threat is a circumstance, condition or event with the potential 
to cause harm to personnel and/or network resources in the form 
of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, denial of service, 
and/or fraud, waste and abuse. [25 . 
Due to the basic nature of paperless transactions in Electronic Data Inter-
change (EDI), the security of an EDI system should be studied in greater 
detail. This chapter addresses the security threats inherent in the present day 
EDI systems such as password guessing attacks, cross-vulnerability, multiplic-
ity of standards along with the threats encountered in distributed systems. 
3.1 Basic Concepts 
As mentioned ."in the previous chapter, EDI is becoming an accepted business 
technology for participating in today's global market. However, this technol-
ogy cannot be implemented in a risk free environment. Users must be assured 
that full consideration has been given to the security issues inherent in the 
use of computers and telecommunications in accomplishing traditional paper-
based activities. Such processes have been targets of fraud and other criminal 
threats. Most companies beheve that the current EDI agreements and third 
party service providers offer adequate security against fraud and errors in EDI 
transactions. This is far from true. There is a definite need to upgrade the 
existing security as the complexity of EDI communities grow [18]. 
The concept of data security developed long before computers. For exam-
ple, cheques are usually written with the background patterns to detect manual 
alteration, while watermarks and other hidden image graphics are used to de-
ter the use of photocopies. The difference between security for paper cheques 
and security for electronic transactions lies in the ways in which fraud can oc-
cur. In electronic transactions fraud can occur through access to unprotected 
data terminals or electronic files or through interception of data as it is being 
transmitted. There are several transmission link types which can be chosen by 
a network - wired cables, terrestrial microwave, communication satellites and 
optical fibers. Different tapping risks exist and different methods are available 
for tapping of each type of link [28]. Commercial network suppliers such as 
INS, ISTEL and IBM have built exhaustive security systems into their net-
works to deter unauthorized entry into the system, although this does not 
guard against the possibility of detectionless methods of tapping such as in-
terception of microwave transmission or wiretapping. 
The level of security sought must be consistent with factors such as: per-
ceived threats to the system; perceived value of the information contained in 
the system and the internal and legal requirements (i.e. audit trails) of an 
organization. The implemented countermeasures must be balanced between 
the perceived threats, economics, ease of use and maintenance of the system. 
Keeping these factors in view, the following security issues need to be coun-
tered to ensure the smooth and secure operation of an EDI system. 
3.2 EDI Security Issues 
For the EDI to be widely accepted in commercial trading, users must be assured 
that the electronic system provides them with the equivalent protection against 
mistakes, misinterpretation and fraudulent activities that is offered by the 
paper and signature system to which they are accustomed. The following 
security issues related to EDI are discussed in view of the security offered in 
the present day systems. 
3.2.1 Password Guessing Attacks 
Most of the present day systems rely on passwords to gain access but, pass-
words are easy to guess and this makes the system vulnerable to password 
guessing attacks. Users are very poor in choosing good passwords. An in-
truder can capture a quantity X that is derived from a password in a known 
way. Then the intruder can use an arbitrate amount of computing power to 
guess passwords, convert them in a known way and see if X is produced. The 
best source of selecting such passwords is the dictionary and hence it is also 
called as dictionary attack, e.g. In Kerberos Authentication System [29, 34], 
when the usee requests the ticket granting ticket {Tc,tgs), the answer is re-
turned encrypted with Kc, a key derived by a publicly-known algorithm from 
the user's password. A guess at the user's password can be confirmed by cal-
culating Kc and using it to decrypt the recorded answer. An intruder, who 
has recorded many such login dialogs, has good odds of finding several new 
passwords. 
3.2.2 Cross Vulnerability 
Generally EDI systems work on a point to point basis or have a limited number 
of trading partners. The security and control features incorporated in the sys-
tem are as strong as the weakest link in the EDI chain. A potential exposure or 
cross-vulnerability due to technical limitation in one EDI system can compro-
mise the integrity of the other dependent EDI systems. Cross-vulnerabilities 
exist between systems that rely on common values for user identification and 
authentication, such as IDs and passwords. 
3.2.3 Multiple Standards 
Trading partners usually work on a variety of standards such as UN/EDIFACT, 
ANSI X12, ODETTE etc. Problems arise when the two trading partners 
adhere to different standards. The security features offered in a particular 
standard may not be comparable to the other standard. 
3.2.4 Authentication 
The extensive use of open networks and distributed systems poses serious 
threats to the security of end-to-end communications and network compo-
nents themselves. A necessary foundation for securing a network is the ability 
to reliably authenticate communication partners and other network entities. 
Authentication is the most important of the security services, because all other 
security services depend upon it. Authentication relates to a scenario where a 
claimant has presented a principal's identity and claims to be that principal. 
Authentication enables a verifier to verify the identity of the principal. 
3.2.5 Non-Repudiation 
In EDI, non-repudiation services provide a communication user with protection 
against another user who later denies that some communication exchange took 
place. While these services do not prevent a user from repudiating another 
user's claim that something occurred, they provide evidence to resolve any 
such disagreement. In general, the evidence must be proved convincingly to the 
third party arbitrator. In data networking environments, repudiation scenarios 
can be separated into two distinct cases: 
• Repudiation of origin : There is disagreement as to whether a particular 
party originated a particular data item. 
• Repudiation of delivery : There is disagreement as to whether a particular 
item was delivered to a receiving party. 
3.2.6 Disclosure of Information 
With the introduction and use of EDI, additional security risks arise apart 
from those which exist for the conventional electronic information systems. 
The computers of a trading partner can initiate transactions inside another 
partner's accounting systems which are processed in a totally automatic en-
vironment. By its very nature, EDI requires that the system be continuously 
open to receive incoming transactions. This means that the system and the 
associated data are exposed continuously to attack and possible compromise. 
An EDI trading agreement is done for the exchange of data among geograph-
ically dispersed participants. Consequently this mechanism is exposed to all 
threats to which the telecommunication system is subjected. Therefore all 
data protection requirements for a distributed telecommunication process are 
applicable to an EDI trading agreements. 
3.2.7 Lack of Hard Copy 
With EDI, the information concerning predetermined subject matter that 
could be conveyed on paper is transferred as a set of electronic messages in 
standardized formats. The information may remain in electronic form and 
may never be printed. The lack of hard copy records and manual signatures 
creates new risks that must be carefully considered in any EDI implementa-
tion. As a result, original hard-copy evidence of obligation or commitment by 
the trading partners may not be available. Instead, electronic records must 
be used. Specific activities must be undertaken to assure that EDI messages, 
such as electronic records, are authentic, properly authorized and completely 
and accurately retained with audit trails for purposes of accountability. 
3.2.8 Other Issues 
In order to accommodate the increased need of the user community, as the 
complexity of an EDI system grows, the security services also need to be up-
graded. In addition, there are various network security threats that need to 
be countered in an EDI system. They include eavesdropping, denial of service, 
packet replay and packet modification. 
Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping allows an intruder to make a complete transcript of network 
activity. As a result, the intruder can obtain sensitive information, such as 
passwords, data, and procedures for performing functions. An intruder can 
gain information by wire tapping, eavesdropping by radio or eavesdropping 
via auxiliary ports on terminals. In today's competitive world, disclosure of 
information about a company may prove fatal for the future of the company. 
Denial of Service 
Multi-user, multi-tasking operating systems are subject to denial of service 
attacks where one user can render the system unusable for legitimate users by 
damaging or destroying resources so that they cannot be used. They may be 
caused accidentally or deliberately. It will help to prevent intentional denial 
of service attacks if precautions are taken to prevent unintentional denial of 
service attacks. 
Systems on a network are vulnerable to overload and destructive attacks 
as well as other types of intentional or unintentional denial of service attacks. 
Three common forms of network denial of service attacks are service over-
loading, message flooding and signal grounding. In service overloading, the 
intruder generates spurious messages to increase the traffic in the network 
thereby degrading the service to the user. In message flooding, the intruder 
generates confusing routing messages or simply flood the network with enough 
garbage data to saturate the links. This may make the network inoperative. 
An active intruder can disrupt the service or ground the signals by intercept-
ing or destroying messages for a particular user. It is important for system 
administrators, to protect against denial of service threats in an EDI system 
without denying access to legitimate users. 
Packet Replay 
Packet replay refers to the recording and the re-transmission of message packets 
in the network. Packet replay is a significant threat for an EDI System because 
an intruder could replay legitimate authentication sequence messages to gain 
access to an EDI system. Packet replay is frequently undetectable, but can be 
prevented by using packet time-stamping and packet sequence counting. 
Packet Modification 
Packet modification is a significant integrity threat which involves one system 
intercepting and modifying a packet destined for another system. In many 
cases, packet information may not only be modified, but may also be destroyed. 
3.3 Risk Analysis 
To counter the above mentioned threats effectively, a risk analysis should be 
performed by the systems staff at the initiation of an EDI project. The risk 
analysis should focus on the these potential risks: 
• Authorized personnel can initiate unauthorized or erroneous transactions 
that could result in excessive costs, fraud, embarrassment, or legal expo-
sure. 
• Unauthorized users can gain access to EDI applications and initiate 
unauthorized transactions or destroy data. 
• Data can be lost, inaccurately transmitted, or altered during transmis-
sion. 
• The EDI application does not meet business objectives or satisfy either 
user or control requirements. 
• Adequate audit trails are not maintained, impairing the organization's 
ability to evaluate controls or potentially exposing it to legal liability. 
• As a result of control weaknesses, the organization is exposed to the 
environment of trading partners. 
• The trading partner agreement does not adequately address liabilities for 
protection of proprietary data, the required components to constitute a 
binding agreement or other necessary clauses. 
• Formal contracts with third party EDI service providers do not ade-
quately address security, system reliability and availability, or responsi-
bilities. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter described the security threats in an EDI system. In chapter 
5,6 and 7, the Direct Store Delivery System^ a model of an EDI system which 
provides the security services for user identification, global authentication, user 
authorization and non-repudiation services is described. 
Chapter 4 
Standards for Secure Message 
Handling 
This chapter describes the X.400, X.500 standards for secure message handling. 
In particular, those security services offered in these standards which can be 
used on a global basis in a networked environment are examined. 
4.1 X.400 Overview 
The X.400 Message Handling System is a form of store and forward type of 
message transfer, including transfer of electronic business data interchange 
and voice messaging. The standards provide security services for end-to-end 
security. A more detailed description is available in the literature [15, 16, 18 . 
In this section, three main aspects of the MHS are described, the functional 
model, the message structure and delivery reporting from the security point of 
view. 
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Figure 4.1: Message Handling System 
4.1.1 Functional Model 
A functional model [25] is shown in the figure 4.1. The MHS is a collection of 
MTAs (Message Transfer Agents), MSs (Message Stores), UAs (User Agents) 
and AUs (Access Units). MTAs perform the store-and-forward message trans-
fer function. MSs provide storage for messages. UAs enable users to access the 
MHS and AUs provide links to other communication systems. MTAs comprise 
of MTS (Message Transfer System), the principal component of the MHS. A 
message is submitted to an MTA by an originating UA, MS or AU, transferred 
to the recipient MTA(s) and deUvered to one or more recipient UAs, MSs or 
AUs. If the message is addressed to multiple recipients, the appropriate MTAs 
perform any splitting (i.e. replicating) of the message needed for delivery to 
each recipient. 
Messages are transferred between MTAs on a cooperating store-and-forward 
basis. Since no end-to-end association is required, the MTA serving the mes-
sage recipient need not be active when the message leaves the originating MTA. 
The message may be stored at an intermediate MTA until the recipient MTA 
becomes operational. 
MTAs transfer messages whose content may be encoded in any format. 
MTAs neither examine nor modify the content of messages except when they 
are performing conversion. Conversion increases the effectiveness of the MHS 
by allowing users to submit messages in one encoded format (e.g. telex) and 
have them delivered in another encoded format. A UA can register with the 
MTA the encoded information types that may be delivered, and request the 
MTA to perform any required conversions. 
The UA is the MHS component that enables a user to access the MHS, for 
both the origination and reception of messages. When submitting messages, 
the UA supplies to an MTA, either directly or indirectly via an MS, the mes-
sage content, the address(es) of the message recipient(s) and the MTS services 
being requested. The message content is the information that the origina-
tor wants transferred to the message recipient(s). The addresses and service 
request data are used by the MTS to deliver the message. When receiving 
messages, the JQA may accept delivery of messages directly from an MTA, or 
it may employ an MS to accept delivery of messages and retrieve them from 
the MHS at a later time. 
The MS is an optional MHS component that acts as an intermediary be-
tween a UA and MTA. The MS often resides with the MTA serving it. The 
primary purpose of the MS is to provide a repository for the delivery of mes-
sages. The UA can retrieve messages from this repository. By using an MS to 
accept delivery of messages, a UA is not required to be constantly available. 
This is especially useful for UA applications implemented on a PC. The MS 
may also submit and forward messages on behalf of the UA, and notify the 
UA at the time of message delivery. 
The AU is the MHS component that provides a gateway between the MHS 
and another communications system. Another AU, the PDAU (Physical De-
livery Access Unit) enables MHS users to send messages to users residing on 
a physical delivery system such as an EDI mailbox. 
4.1.2 Message Structure 
The message structure consists of a message envelope and a message content. 
The envelope represents the information required by the MTS to deliver the 
message, such as the address of the recipient and any special handling in-
structions. Many X.400 security parameters are transferred on the message 
envelope. The message content represents the information that the originator 
wants conveyed to the message recipient. 
4.1.3 Delivery Reporting 
The basic X.400 messaging service provides notification of message non-delivery. 
When a message cannot be delivered to a recipient, a non-delivery report is 
generated and returned to the originator. The content of the non-delivery re-
port contains the status information about the subject message. The MTA 
also provides notification of delivery as an optional service. If the message 
originator requests acknowledgment of successful delivery, a delivery report is 
returned to the originator by the recipient's MTA upon delivery of the subject 
message. 
4.2 Security Related Data Structures 
The security label and the token are used to convey security related informa-
tion between communicating parties. This section defines only the principal 
attributes comprising the structures. 
4.2.1 Security Label 
A security label is a collection of attributes associated with an MHS message 
or entity which permits its classification in terms of a security level. The se-
curity label attributes include: 
A security policy identifier which identifies the security policy with which 
the security label is associated, 
A printable privacy mark which identifies the level of privacy to be afforded : 
in a message or report, 
A security classification which classifies a message or report for security 
purposes, 
A set of security categories which restricts the context of the privacy mark, 
the security classification, or both. The categories are application-defined, and 
may include codewords to the privacy mark or security classification. 
Security labels may be transferred in MHS messages and reports, conveyed 
during the association establishment between the two entities (e.g. A UA may 
transfer security labels when connecting to its MTA), or registered with MHS 
entities (e.g. an MTA may maintain a registry of security labels for its users). 
4.2.2 Token 
The token is a signed data structure used to convey security-related informa-
tion from an originator to a single recipient. It consists of a series of data fields 
with the digital signature appended. The general form of a token is: 
A{sgnAlg, B, sgnData, encAlg, Bp[encData] } 
where A is the name of the originator of the token, sgnAlg identifies the algo-
rithm used by the originator to compute the signature, t^ is a time stamp, B is 
the name of the intended recipient, Bp[encData] is the data encData encrypted 
under the public key of B i.e. Bp, encAlg identifies the asymmetric algorithm 
used to perform this encryption, and sgnData and encData are collections of 
security related parameters. The contents of the sgnData and encData depend 
on the security services being provided. The attributes comprising the token 
include: 
• the name of the recipient 
• the date and time the token was generated 
• a collection of additional fields that is signed (signed-data): 
- a content confidentiality algorithm identifier, 
- a content interity check, 
- a message security label, 
- a request for proof of delivery, 
- a message sequence number, 
- a nonce 
• a collection of data fields that is encrypted (encrypted-data): 
— a symmetric key used to encrypt the content, 
— a symmetric key used to compute a content integrity check, 
— a content integrity check, 
— a message security label, 
— a message sequence number. 
The attributes of the token are protected by the digital signature of the orig-
inator. The token provides three forms of cryptographic protection. First, 
it ensures that only the recipient can view the plaintext information in the 
encrypted-data. Second, it ensures that the token has not been modified. 
Third, it authenticates the identity of the token originator. 
4.3 X.400 Security Limitations 
The basic security services provided by the X.400 standards include: message 
security labeling, secure access management, origin authentication, data in-
tegrity, data confidentiality, non-repudiation and security management. 
One security limitation is that the data in the token is encrypted before it 
is signed. This is considered to be a poor practice because the recipient can au-
thenticate the encrypted data, not the plaintext data. In a worst case scenario, 
a malicious party can intercept a message, and create a new message keeping 
the encrypted content of the original message, but generating a new message 
token. The new token would be signed by the malicious party. Under these 
circumstances, the message recipient could could be fooled into believing that 
the malicious party originated the message. This can be avoided depending 
on how the security services are implemented. For instance, defining a token 
so that the encryption is performed after the signature is calculated, removes 
the limitations but at the cost of some increase in processing. 
A second limitation pertains to the MS (Message Store). An MS can accept 
the delivery of messages on behalf of a UA. If a message originator requests 
proof of delivery for a message whose content is encrypted, and the message 
is delivered to an MS, the MS would require access to the encryption key to 
provide the service. This would involve providing the MS with the recipient's 
private key to decrypt the message and perform verification, or providing a 
shared key between the recipient and the originator. Neither case is desirable 
from a security standpoint. This is one scenario where a recipient (i.e. the 
Message Store) might ignore the originator's request for proof of delivery. 
A final limitation pertains to the MTS services which access the message 
content or message recipient. An MTA may perform conversion on incoming 
messages. Any type of conversion invalidates integrity checks. Also, if the con-
tent is encrypted, the conversion cannot be performed without the MTA first 
decrypting the content. To decrypt the content, the MTA would access the 
encryption key, which is not desirable from the security point of view. Similar 
problems result from services that modify the message recipient, such as MTA 
expanding a distribution list or redirecting a message. If an MTA performs 
such a service on a message where the recipient's public key is used as input 
to some security service (e.g. to encrypt the encrypted-data of a token), the 
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Figure 4.2: EDI Message Structure 
The communication of EDI messages require that the messages are in struc-
tured format before they are transmitted on a network. To facilitate the trans-
mission of structured messages in a message handling system, X.435 or Pedi 
standard was developed. 
4.4 X.435 
EDI interchanges can be conveyed in many ways - directly over a telephone 
















Figure 4.3: X.435 Security 
The basic concept in X.435 standard is that there are special EDI messages 
(EDIMs) consisting of a heading and a body part as shown in the figure 4.2 
Typically a body part could be an EDIFACT interchange or an ANSI X.12 
EDI interchange. The heading contains many fields concerned with identifying 
the message and specifying how it is to be handled. An EDI message can be 
broken down into several components: 
• Data Elements - the smallest indivisible piece of data which is equivalent 
to words in the spoken language; 
• Segments - a set or group of related data elements; 
• Messages - a set or group of segments in the order specified by the 
standard. Each message specifies a specific transaction. 
Additionally, EDI Notifications (EDINs) exist, specifically to address the prob-
lem of confirmation of receipt at the application level (i.e. by the receiving 
EDI application) as opposed to simply confirmation of delivery. In figure 4.3, 
there is a special EDI-UA together in a trusted environment that accesses the 
underlying MTS, with added EDI-MS. EDINs are special messages linked to 
the original subject EDIM by appropriate cross references. They contain a 
series of common fields followed by positive, negative or forwarded fields, de-
pending on the nature of EDINs. EDIMs and EDINs introduce new security 
elements of services, essentially to guarantee the genuineness of EDIN, as valid 
confirmation of EDIMs. 
4.5 X.500 Directory Services 
The objective of the X.500 Directory is to provide a logical global database 
for public and private directory services. The Directory is a collection of dis-
tributed open systems that cooperate to hold a logical database of information 
about a set of objects in the real world. The users of the Directory can read or 
modify the information, or parts of it, subject to permission being given. The 
access to the Directory is interactive - supporting both browsing and auto-
matic lookup. The application process employs user friendly naming schemes 
to achieve this. 
A global directory requires co-operation between a large number of network 
operators and service providers, each of which administers a range of names 
and addresses and maintains its own separate database. There are three kinds 
of information held in a directory: 
• User information that is intended for use primarily by the people and 
systems that access the Directory to obtain data such as electronic mail 
address, phone numbers, network address and public key identity certifi-
cates. 
• Operational information that is intended for use primarily by the Direc-
tory system itself. Examples of such systems include access controls and 
internal consistency requirements that the Directory must maintain. 
• Server information that is used by each server to identify the location 
and contents of the other servers. 
4.5.1 Functional Organization of Directory 
The X.500 Directory Standard identifies two major functional components for 
the Directory. These are the Directory User Agent (DUA) and the Directory 
System Agent (DSA). The DUA represents a user of the Directory and provides 
access to the DSAs that process the actual Directory requests. The Directory 
information may be distributed amongst a set of co-operating DSAs to provide 
an integrated service called a Distributed Directory. A DSA may also operate 
as a free standing single database, referred to as a Centralized Directory. The 
overview of the distributed directory is shown in figure 4.4 The information 
entries contained in the Directory are referred to as the Directory Information 
Base (DIB) which is structured to form a Directory Information Tree (DIT). 
The protocols that take place within a directory are Directory Access Protocol 
(DAP) which define the exchange of requests and outcomes between DUA and 
DSA; and Directory System Protocol (DSP) which defines the exchange of 
requests and outcomes between two DSAs. 
Figure 4.4: Distributed Directory 
4.5.2 X.509 Directory Authentication Framework 
The recommendations define a framework for the provision of authentication 
services by the Directory to its users. The recommendations provide two com-
plementary goals: 
• distribution of trusted keys and enforcement of access controls to infor-
mation based on the rights of the requester, 
• confidence held in the information held in the Directory provided to 
identify that user. 
Authentication can only be provided within the context of a defined security 
policy. The recommendations provide two types of authentication - simple au-
thentication based on password as a verification of claimed identity and strong 
authentication"'employing credentials formed using cryptographic techniques 
which will be described in chapter 7. 
The Directory recommendations are based on public key cryptosystems. It 
is a major advantage of such systems that the user certificates may be held in 
a directory database as attributes and may be freely communicated within the 
directory systems and obtained by users of the Directory in the same manner 
as other directory information. The user certificates are assumed to be formed 
by offline means and placed in the Directory by its creator (Certification Au-
thority). When a CA issues a certificate to a user, the certificate binds the 
name and the public component of the user. The general structure of the 
certificate using the Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN) is: 
Certificate := SIGNED { SEQUENCE { 







1] IMPLICIT Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL, 
- - if present, version must be v2 
[2] IMPLICIT Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL 
- - if present, version must be v2 - - } } 
Before users can mutually authenticate, the Directory will supply complete 











The MHS (X.400) standards include very comprehensive security facilities. 
The basic end-to-end services are provided without having to trust the under-
lying MTS. The message path services contribute to secure communications 
throughout the MHS environment, placing requirements on functional com-
ponents of all types. Transfer of EDI transactions over the MHS backbone 
employs a special MHS content type. Security functions can also be provided 
within the EDI content, using features in the EDI format. 
The Directory is an important open-system network application which can 
play a valuable role in supporting the information retrieval needs of other ap-
plications. The Directory is also significant to network security because of the 
role it can play as a distributor of public key certificates for use by any network 
application. 
In the next chapter, we use these standards in the proposed model to 
provide the security services. 
Chapter 5 
Direct Store Delivery System 
This chapter describes the proposed model of the Direct Store Delivery Sys-
tem. In the model, the transactions are carried out using a trusted third party 
service provider or Value Added Network Service provider. Basic functions 
such as user registration, notary services, key management facilities, audit 
trails and secure gateways are provided by the third party service provider. 
In the proposed model, the X.500 standards were used based on the Directory 
Services for resolving address issues and mutual authentication based on prin-
cipal global identity. The transactions of the EDI messages are carried out 
using the UN/EDIFACT standard in a message handling system environment. 
5.1 The System Model 
The Direct Store Delivery System [10] model is based on the concept of JIT 
inventory management. In business, JIT inventory management is gaining 
widespread acceptance especially amongst retailers. It focuses on the reduction 
of the inventories of the companies involved and the audit of their production. 
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Figure 5.1: Direct Store Delivery System 
inventory costs are decreased as the required level of stock is reduced. EDI 
facilitates the adoption of these J IT techniques by providing timely and accu-
rate information which is required on a daily basis, whilst promoting the trust 
and commitment required on a long term basis. 
The Direct Store Delivery System is a chain of stores where ordering and 
deliveries are carried out centrally. The chain handles the distribution to the 
individual stores as shown in figure 5.1. It uses EDI to place bulk order on the 
suppliers nominating the quantity needed and the expected t ime of delivery. 
Thus, the retailers continue to get the benefit of centralized ordering and as a 
consequence reduces inventory and saves on warehouse and material handling 
costs. The merchandise can be ordered faster and a given item is never out 
of stock. The use of Electronic Data Interchange results in error reduction in 
entering data, reduces paperwork and improves cash flow thus resulting in an 
efficient trading cycle. 
To be able to communicate efficiently with trading partners, the X.500 
standards for user friendly addressing is used. Trading can be carried out on a 
global basis since the users have unique names and are identified on the basis of 
principal global identity. In accordance to the X.509 Directory Authentication 
Framework, the certificates contain public keys of the trading partners which 
can be freely communicated in a distributed environment. 
The system is modeled in an EDI Messaging System as shown in figure 5.2. 
The EDI service provides a user with features to assist in communicating with 
other service users. The EDIMS model comprises of an EDI User Agent, EDI 
Message Store and Access Units, all of which are supported by the Message 
Handling System. The UAs in the EDIMS comprise of a specific class of 
co-operating UAs. The Physical Delivery Access Unit allows EDI Users to 
send messages to users outside the EDIMS who have no access to the MHS. 
The EDI class of UAs create messages containing contents specific to the EDI 
Messaging Service. The EDI message is conveyed in an envelope when being 
transferred through the MTS. The whole transaction process can be divided 
into the following independent processes. 
5.1.1 Sending EDI Messages 
Before the actual messages are sent, they need to be processed including the 
conversion of the in-house application into a structured EDI message. The 
initiation process creates the addressing/envelope information necessary to 
route the EDI message through X.400 Message Handling System. The EDI 
initiator reads the messages from a file, creates the envelope information and 
passes, without modification, the EDI message as the content of the mail. To 
create the X.400 envelope information, the initiation process uses information 
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Figurey5.2: Functional Model of Direct Store Delivery System 
from the contents of the X.500 Directory entries and the contents of EDI 
envelope messages. The envelope messages provide the distinguished name of 
the X.500 entries that contain the envelope information. The initiator process 
does not interpret any part of the actual EDI message. In theory, any EDI 
content could be sent. The initiator process can also process files containing 
multiple EDI messages but each message is sent in its own X.400 envelope. 
Once it has built the X.400 envelope, the initiator process passes the EDI 
message as X.400 mail to the service provider. More than one envelope message 
can be used depending upon the transaction. 
5.1.2 Routing of Messages 
The service provider routes X.400 mail for the EDI through the EDI Messaging 
Environment. In particular, the service provider uses the Originator/Recipient 
address (i.e. the trading partner's 0 / R address), the Message Transfer Agent 
and other entities in the X.500 Directory to find the route to the recipient. 
These routing entries-must be configured for the EDI mail. The router also uses 
entries from its local routing information to find the route and other entities 
that define the receiving MTA to ensure that the routing path supports the 
X.400 mail. The trusted third party also provides a mail box for receiving the 
messages from the other trading partners. 
5.1.3 Receipt of the EDI Message 
f 
The X.400 EDI messages must be received by the third party service provider 
and retrieved from the mail queue identified by a command to receive the mail. 
The receiver process uses an entry in the local MTA's routing information to 
determine if the address is local and to find a processing queue required by the 
EDI message. It then opens the X.400 envelope, provides some basic verifica-
tion of the X.400 messages and saves the content of the EDI message, without 
modification. Also the delivery response is sent to the originator conforming 
the receipt of the message. The auditing of the whole process is done by the 
third party service provider and the user is able to keep the a log of all the 
transactions. 
The proposed model does not offer an interactive EDI solution as the mes-
sages are delivered on a store and forward basis. The third party service 
providers provide the users with mailboxes and the transactions can be dumped 
into the mailbox of a trading partner who can later retrieve it for processing. 
5.2 Summary 
The Direct Store Delivery System Model presents a cost effective solution for 
carrying out business using EDI on a global basis. In the next chapter the 
security involved in transmitting EDI messages over communications networks 
and a proposal to enhance the security in these systems is discussed. 
Chapter 6 
Security in EDIFACT 
This chapter describes the UN/EDIFACT standards for structuring EDI mes-
sages. It discusses the security in the existing EDIFACT standard with the 
proposal to enhance the security in EDIFACT standards by incorporating cer-
tificates, digital signatures and security purposes in the messages itself. 
6.1 Basic Concepts 
In chapter 2, EDI has been defined as the application-to-application exchange 
of electronic data across organizational boundaries, in such a way that no hu-
man intervention or interpretation is required. The development of standards 
is a crucial factor in the EDI systems. The EDI standards provide the structure 
required for computers or, more specifically, applications running on comput-
ers to be able to read and process electronic data. For example, supermarket 
items come from different suppliers either directly or through wholesalers. The 
supermarket issues purchasing orders daily, which are sorted and distributed 
to its suppliers. The supermarket does all the trading through EDI for quicker 
delivery and overall accuracy in ordering. To carry out transactions smoothly 
between various suppliers, they should have an agreed standard to format the 
data and exchange other forms of information like invoice, payment orders etc. 
Since there is no human intervention in EDI, it becomes necessary to develop 
an internationally standard in EDI to satisfy the needs of the large customers 
and the suppliers scattered globally. There are various standards developed to 
cope up with this problem of incompatibility, e.g. ANSI X12, UN/EDIFACT, 
ODETTE etc. The UN/EDIFACT standard has been accepted by the ISO as 
the universal standard for all document translation activities world-wide. 
6.2 EDIFACT Standard 
The UN/EDIFACT standard [36, 41]specifies syntax rules for EDI for admin-
istration, commerce, and transport to structure the EDI messages. 
The document structures used in the standards have generally been uni-
fied, introducing principles and rules for their specification. Moreover, every 
document is suggested in the standard in terms of its structure and the prop-
erties of the structural components. In this way, these standards should cover 
all situations emerging in practice. 
The EDIFACT syntax [41] defines the elements used to structure exchanges 
of data as shown in figure 6.1. It consists of one or more Messages, each re-
lated to a particular transaction, grouped together in an Interchange. The 
f. 
Interchange is an outermost envelope, and contains information about the 
sender and recipient (addressing) in the header, and about the total number 
of Messages in an Interchange in the trailer. This structure is just like having 
records in a data file. 
Interchange Interchange Interchange 
UNA UNB Either Functional or Messages UNZ Group 
UNO Message Message Message UNE 
Data Data Data UNT UNH > 9 Segment Segment Segment 
Tag Simple Data Element Composite Data Element 
Code Value Component Component Data Element • Data Element 
Value Value 
Figure 6.1: EDIFACT Structure 
Messages themselves are formed from Segments^ which in turn are built 
from Data Elements. The Data elements are identified by their position in the 
Segment, as indicated by the number of Data elements separators, and can 
be of variable length. Segments are identified by three characters (the tag) at 
the beginning and have their own Segment separators. They can also repeat. 
Their use may be either mandatory or conditional depending" on the trans-
action taking place or the data to be conveyed, e.g. financial transactions, 
invoices, purchase order etc. 
The message is the innermost envelope, and has a header which specifies 
the type of message (e.g. payment order, invoice) and a trailer which counts 
the number of segments in the message. The Interchange and the Message 
headers and trailers are also Segments. Since their three latter tag starts with 
the letter U, they are known as Service Segments, which are held in the Syntax 
Directory, rather than the User Directory, which contain Message Segments. 
Thus, qualitative and quantitative information is contained in separate 
fields. Besides their value, they are assigned some meaning and properties, 
for example data format attributes. Different levels of nesting of the segment 
groups and segments are allowed to make parts of a document dependent on 
hierarchically higher segment levels. 
6.3 Security in EDIFACT 
The EDIFACT security documents [37, 38, 39] defines practical implementa-
tion of various EDIFACT security services within the message themselves. The 
features offered by the standards include the following: 
• independence of and transparent to the communication medium used; 
• an open standard which supports all existing security mechanisms; 
• the employment of security mechanisms such as confidentiality, authen-
tication, integrity, non-repudiation etc. at application level; 
• security services to be implemented by trading partners themselves, end 
to end and transparent to the underlying communication protocols, which 
may themselves provide security services; 
• without making changes to individual messages. A global approach is 
adopted which can be applied to any message irrespective of the business 
application. 
The basic security services used to protect an EDI message are: 
Message Content Integrity 
Message Content Integrity guarantees detection of unauthorized data modifi-
cation of a message. It is achieved by sending with the message an integrity 
control value. This value is computed by using the asymmetric algorithms. 
The receiver of the message computes the integrity control value of the data 
actually received, using the corresponding algorithm and parameters and then 
compares the result with the value received. 
f . 
Message Sequence Integrity 
Message Sequence Integrity prevents duplication, addition, deletion, loss or 
replay of messages. It is guaranteed with a message sequence number or a 
t imestamp added to the message. In order to give full protection, the integrity 
of a sequence number or a timestamp must be guaranteed. 
Message Origin Authentication 
Message Origin Authentication protects against the actual sender of the mes-
sage claiming to be some other authorized entity. It authenticates the origin 
of data and gives to the recipient the proof that the source of data received is 
as claimed. Message origin authentication is achieved by sending the digital 
signature along with the message. 
6.3.1 Message Level Security 
Security is incorporated in the individual messages. In EDIFACT standard, 
specific groups of security segments for message level protection are introduced. 
These security services are interpreted in the messages with the help of security 
headers and trailers. These segments can be used with any EDIFACT message. 
They are placed just after the message header and before the message trailer 
segments (UNH and UNT). The headers and trailers are actually a group of 
segments and can repeat, depending on the security needed, in any particular 
transaction. The overall structure of the security header and trailer is as shown 
in figure 6.2. 
The security message header and trailer are reported for all the security ser-
vices applied tb protect the message. For example, a message may be secured 
by several entities and so the security related information may be repeated 
to allow the identification of several signing or authentication entities and 
correspondingly to include several digital signatures or control values. This 
approach allows maximum flexibility. 
UNH Msg 
SEC 
NAD RFF DTM 
Security Message Header 
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ALG DTM RST 
UNT : Message Trailer 
UNH : Message Header 
SEC : Security Mechanism 
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Msg : Standard Message 
Figure 6.2: Security in EDIFACT 
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SEC 1 : Authentication of Origin 
RFF 2 : Security Sequence Number 
ALG 3 : Hash Function to Sign + Parameters 
CER 4 : Certificate of signer 
SLK 5 : Number of Security Header 
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NAD 7 : Certification Authority 
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Figure 6.3: EDIFACT Message Using the Digital Signature 
The following procedure [46] outlines the use of public key cryptoalgorithm 
to ensure the origin authentication as shown in figure 6.4 
• The sender server creates the digital signature of the message m to be 
transmit ted. 
s=hash(7n) 
• The sending party signs the message digest (the digital signature) s using 
its private key K^ : s = EKI(S) 
• The sender transmits (m, 5) 
• The resolver decrypts 5 by using sender's public key K^ = s = D K C ( s ) 
• the resolver recomputes the message digest s = hash(m) 
• if {s=s) then the resolver has validated the integrity and the originator 
of the message. 
The run time for the public key cryptoalgorithm is quite high. Many CPU 
cycles are needed. Hence, we take the fixed size of the output of the algorithm 
i.e. the hashed contents of the message. A strong hash function should have 
the following properties: 
• The hash function must be one-way i.e. given any possible hash result it 
must be computationally infeasible to construct an input message which 
hashes to this result (examples are the MD2, MD4, MD5 and HAVAL 
algorithms) 
• the signature (message digest) produces a fixed length output. 
• the hash function must be collision-free, i.e. it must be computationally 
infeasible to construct two distinct input messages which hash to the 
same result. 
For example, a digital signature or MAC is introduced in the security mes-
sage itself without changing the syntax of the EDI message. In the figure 6.3, 
the digital signature is added to provide authentication of origin. In detail, 
the security header contains: 
1. The type of security function provided, e.g. authentication, integrity. 
2. Whether security acknowledgment is required. 
3. The character set used to represented the printed characters when the 
result was calculated, e.g. ASCII, EBCDIC. 
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received digital signature 
Figure 6.4: Digital Signature Generation and Validation 
4. The roles of the security provider, e.g. issuing the message, witnessing 
their message. 
5. Identification of security sender and recipient, e.g. who signed the mes-
sage. 
6. A sequence number and/or a timestamp. 
7. The algorithms used to calculate the security result, e.g. RSA [1], MD5, 
DES. 
8. A number to link the header to the corresponding trailer. 
The security trailer contains: 
1. The security result, e.g. MAC or digital signature. 
2. A number to link the trailer to the corresponding header 
6.3.2 Security Data Elements 
The UN/EDDFACT security recommendations employ a considerable number of 
optional segments and data elements. In addition to that, some data elements 
have large field length definitions. This allows for the accommodation of all 
known security techniques and also possible evolutions thus providing the user 
with maximum flexibility in implementing the security mechanisms. However, 
once the user selects the appropriate security services to use, only a small subset 
of segments and data elements will be utilized and the actual size of the data 
elements would be shorter. The most important segments in the data elements are 
SEC 
Security service is actually provided, e.g. authentication of origin, message 
content integrity etc. 
ALG 
Identification techniques and algorithms used. 
CER 
Technical parameter required, e.g. certificates, key identification, user name etc. 
RST 
Security results e.g. MAC, integrity value, digital signature etc. 
The approval of using the security segments for the message security level does 
not require syntax changes to the EDBFACT messages. The solution consists in 
the definition of the EDCFACT rule that states the acceptance of two approved 
forms of each existin«^ EDEFACT message : one with security and one without 
security. If the message must be secure then the security features must be in 
accordance to the recommendations of EDIFACT. 
The two security services, not addressed by this structure, are the non-
repudiation and the confidentiality of the messages. 
Non-repudiation of messages require the recipient to issue and acknowledgment 
message which is signed by them. This special service is known as AUTACK 
(Authentication and Acknowledgment). It contains the same segment as in the 
EDIFACT standard to allow the recipient to sign the message, whilst the message 
itself contains unique references to the messages of the sender. This unique 
reference is usually composed of the message number (from the message header) 
and the security result (from the message trailer). Many original messages can be 
acknowledged by a single AUTACK. The AUTACK message has a second 
purpose. If the message is originally sent without security, it can subsequently 
carry a signature or a MAC for that message and the calculated hash value of the 
message. It is used sometimes where bulk data is sent, then the transactions are 
authorized and authenticated afterwards. It also provides a means of signing the 
whole interchange,until the security of the interchange level is used in the syntax. 
Confidentiality is addressed by the introduction of a new message. The reason is 
that if all the data between the message header and the trailer is simply encrypted 
(and filtered to produce only the valid syntax as defined in EDIFACT), then the 
count on the number of the segments in the message trailer no longer matches the 
number of segment separators in die message. This may confuse some networks 
and translators. For this reason, the whole of the original message, including 
all the headers and the trailers, is encrypted and filtered, and the result is put 
into a string of 350 byte free text segments. The security header is added, to 
describe the security originator and recipient, the encryption algorithm, filter 
function used and possibly the message encryption keys protected by public 
key techniques. When security is incorporated in the EDIFACT syntax, it is 
possible to introduce this header information to the normal message security 
header and also to the message to be encrypted. 
6.4 Summary 
In the Direct Store Delivery System, it is possible to incorporate EDIFACT 
message structures with enhanced security functions [38]. The secure EDI-
FACT message will include the following functions: 
• Generation and storage of asymmetric cryptographic keys (in the form 
of X.509 certificates). 
• Distribution of certificates from the administrator's station where cer-
tificates are generated to EDI servers( by ftp protocol) 
• Generation and handling of symmetric cryptographic keys for encryption 
and integrity of EDI messages. 
• encryption and integrity of outgoing messages, together with signing of 
the symmetric keys and 
• verification of the signature of the symmetric key on receipt, decryption 
of the message and their integrity verification. 
In the next chapter, the security hi the communications networks is discussed. 




This chapter describes the security services provided by the proposed model 
in an EDI environment. The model primarily provides security functions like 
mutual authentication based on X.500 standards, user identification, non -
repudiation of origin and receipt for transferring EDI messages. 
7.1 EDI Security Implementation 
Security of a distributed system is a topic of growing importance. The security 
breaches of the last few years (internet worm) have demonstrated the need to 
have strong security policies and techniques to ensure reliable communication. 
The goal of any system is to carry transactions in an open and secure fashion 
either on a point-to-point basis or on a public data network. The crucial 
question that needs to be addressed before implementing the security services, 
is their placement at appropriate level in the ISO/OSI reference model. Given 
the nature of the type of security processing to be performed (e.g. integrity 
checking), it is essential that the security mechanisms be invoked while the 
entire EDI information segments is still intact. The reasons for locating the 
security services in the model at the application level are: 
• they satisfy security requirements which are inherently meaningful only 
to a particular application, e.g. access control to application-internal 
resources, or non-repudiation; 
• protect selected fields within application protocols, e.g. the PIN in a 
financial transaction; 
• protect information conveyed through multiple end systems in distributed 
applications, e.g. application level store-and-forward; and 
• provide end-system level protection, without forcing an application to 
depend on a particular underlying protocol (e.g. the OSI transport or 
network protocol). 
7.2 Assumptions 
The security services are based on the X.400 and X.500 standards. In providing 
the security services in the model of the Direct Store Delivery System, it is 
assumed that the Directory is free from tampering and the certificates obtained 
from the Directory are unforgeable. The following assumptions are made in 
the X.500 standards for the secure exchange of certificates: 
• A secure bind from the Directory User Agent (DUA) to a Directory 
Service Agent (DSA); this is a secured Directory Access Protocol (DAP). 
• If two DSAs are to communicate with each other, they may do so by a 
secured access between them of the Directory Systems Protocol (DSP). 
If the DUA requests information which is not on the DSA to which 
it is bound, that DSA may request the information from other DSAs 
by secured DSP enquiries; the data will not be returned to the DUA 
(referral); the DUA may then make a strong bind to the referred DSA 
with DSP. 
7.3 Computer Security Planning for EDI 
The network service provider should provide the protocol conversion and mail 
box facility for storing messages of the various trading partners. In addition, 
the basic security services and audit trails should be kept by the trusted third 
party [32 . 
7.3.1 Risk Based Implementation 
In the development of computer security plans for EDI, agencies should allocate 
resources according to the risk and magnitude of potential harm resulting from 
the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information 
contained or transmitted by the EDI system. In EDI, certain types of messages 
may be more inherently sensitive than others. There must be assurance that 
each price quotation or purchase order is accurate and has been sent from 
the named originator. Less care would need to be taken with invoice sent 
to an agency, if the agency's internal control system is sufficiently robust to 
automatically reject all non-authentic invoices. 
7.3.2 Maintenance of Electronic Records 
EDI messages that are transmitted must be included in the system of elec-
tronic records. It must be ensured that : - the records of EDI interchanges are 
complete; unauthorized modification or alterations to records are prevented; 
all modifications or alterations are automatically recorded in an electronic au-
dit trail and dates and times of relevant activities are recorded and are correct 
and precise. 
7.3.3 Audit Trail for Message Authorization 
With the paper documents that are sent to the recipient, the handwritten 
signature of an authorizing officer is usually used to obligate the originator; 
a notation that the original was signed is often seen on a retained copy. An 
equivalent must be provided for each EDI message used as a replacement. An 
electronic copy of each transmitted EDI message, together with the proof of 
approval, should be retained for audit purposes. 
7.4 Security Services 
7.4.1 User Identification 
To use the EDI system services, the user has first to identify his credentials to 
the server. Once the credentials are established, the user can use the services 
to either query the database or carry out other transactions. There are two 
practical approaches in the user identification. 
In the first approach, the user, after entering the name, is prompted for a 
password which consists of the user's name, a one-way hash of the password, 
a timestamp and a nonce which is returned to the user to be used . To pre-
vent the hash of the password and the nonce from being intercepted over the 
network, they are encrypted using the public key of the CA. If the one way 
hash of the password from the database matches with that of the user, the CA 
returns the nonce encrypted with the public key of the originator. 
The second approach is used in retail stores which use a standalone PC 
for communicating EDI messages. To identify the individuals responsible for 
signing the transactions, a personal token such as smart cards [47] can be used 
for user identification. Smart cards are unforgeable and provide reliable means 
of identification. 
7.4.2 Authentication 
Authentication is used to: 
• verify the identity of the sender of a message to the receiver in order to 
detect spoofing or impersonation. 
• verify the integrity of the message by detecting changes (modifications) 
in a message introduced between the sending and receiving process. 
• protect a unique message identifier used to detect attempts at insertion, 
deletion or replay of messages. 
Most of the above threats can be countered by using strong authentication. 
In this, neither the entity which is authenticated nor any eavesdropper on the 
conversation can furnish the ability to impersonate the authenticating princi-
pal. There are some interception attacks which cannot be countered by strong 
authentication only. Hence, additional data encryption is needed to secure the 
channel. The well known cryptosystems are RSA using public key techniques 
and DES, LOKI using symmetric key techniques. RSA is a widely preferred 
algorithm for digital signatures as well as for authentication with secrecy. 
The message-origin authentication service is provided by the existence of 
the message token containing the signature which uniquely identifies the origin 
of the message. To achieve this, the content integritij check is included in the 
signed data part of the token. 
The receiver obtains the trusted copy of the public key from the Certi-
fication Authority of the sender. If the CAs of the sender and receiver are 
different then the receiver uses the certification path that has been supplied as 
a part of the originator's certificate, to determine the copy of the receiver CA's 
public key. Using this the receiver validates the signature on the originator's 
certificate. 
7.4.3 Authentication Protocol 
The X.509 Directory Authentication framework is defined in the standards. 
This protocol is a slight modification of the standard mutual protocol [15] due 
to the security defects mentioned in the existing X.509 protocol [27, 30, 45 . 
Notat ions : 
CA Certification Authority 
E Encryption 
D Digital Signature 
Rc Nonce by C 
K Secret Key of C 
K Public Key of C 
ti t imestamp 
h(X) hashed content of message X 
data\ plaintext data from C 
datal encrypted data from C 
Concatenation 
The exchange between the two parties A and B starts with A sending a mes-
sage to the Certification Authority (in this appHcation the Third Party who 
acts as a CA) to find the pubhc component of B [2 . 
Stepl. A-^CA A.B 
Step2. CA^A D1.D2 
Step3. A-^B D^.RA.B.datal.E(kl,datal).D{kl, 
h(RA.B.data\.E{kl, datal)) 
StepA. B^ A RB.A.RA.data\.E{kl, datal). 
D[kl.h{RB.A.RA.datal.E(kl,datal))) 
Stepb. A-^B RB-D(kl.h{RB, B)) 
In the second step, the CA sends A, the certificates of both A and B. In 
order to sign data, the user applies a one-way hash function to the data fol-
lowed by the digital signature D. Timestamps are needed to guard against the 
replay attack [3]. An intruder is not able to replace the messages in the above 
steps since he does not have the secret key of the CA. In the third step, A 
generates a nonce RA, which is used to detect replay attacks and to prevent 
forgery. Additionally A can send some plaintext data datal which he signs to 
preserve the integrity and some secret data datal- On receiving the message 
from A, B verifies the certificate, checks that B itself is the intended recipient, 
timestamp is current and optionally checks whether RA has not been replayed. 
B then generates a nonce RB for similar purposes to RA- Additionally B can 
also send some plaintext data data] and secret data datal. A checks that A is 
the intended recipient, RA is identical to the one which was sent by A and the 
RB is not been replayed. It responds to B by sending the nonce RB along with 
the B. On reception, B checks the signature and thus the integrity of the signed 
information and also checks that RB is identical to the one which was sent by B. 
In this way, at the end of the protocol, both the users are convinced that 
they are communicating with the right person. The above authentication 
process safeguards the integrity as well as confidentiality of the message. The 
users can then generate a session key which is used to encrypt the subsequent 
traffic on the association. 
7.4.4 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation of origin protects the recipient from the sender's denial of 
having ever sent the message. Protection can be achieved by the sender in-
cluding the digital signature with the message and the receiver sending the 
acknowledgment which contains the digital signature. 
The non-repudiation of delivery does not necessarily imply that the recipi-
ent read the data or acted upon it in any way. The recipient can acknowledge 
the receipt by generating an acknowledgment message back to the originator, 
with the message containing the digital signature computed on a copy or a 
digest of the eontents of the original delivered data item. Figure 7.1 shows 
the operation where the recipient's digital signature is used. The sender of 
the message requests this service from the receiver by by including a proof of 
delivery request flag as a part of the signed data in the message token to the 






Figure 7.1: Non-Repudiation of Delivery 
message content and the various other parameters. The receiver then returns 
the proof of delivery together with his certificate to the sender of the message. 
7,4.5 Responsibility 
A new feature in EDI MS is the EDI responsibihty notification. The purpose 
of introducing the concept of EDIMS Responsibility is primarily to provide 
a method for confirming the passing of messages amongst UAs. In EDIMS a 
user or user application can request a notification of responsibility of a message 
by a recipient or a recipient application. This notification is requested by an 
originating UA and is generated by a recipient UA taking the responsibility 
for the message. Responsibility implies that a message received is either avail-
able to the EDIMS user or that it is forwarded with changes. One notification 
serves to carry both the positive response above and a negative response. The 
negative response means that the message referred to will not be processed by 
an EDI application. It is possible to forward a received message unchanged 
and pass the obligation to respond to the responsibility notification request to 
the forward recipient, or intermediate recipients who then must respond to the 
originator of the message. 
The Responsibility field is represented as : 
ResponsibilityForwarded ::= BOOLEAN (Default FALSE) 
If this field is TRUE it indicates to the receiving UA that Responsibility was 
forwarded. If this value is FALSE (or absent), it indicates to the receiving UA 
that the security elements of the inner envelope have been checked. 
7.4.6 Key Management 
Regardless of the type of cryptosystem used, either symmetric or asymmetric, 
it is necessary for the communicating parties to obtain each others keys. In the 
proposed model, the X.500 Directory services were used for the distribution of 
certificates which contain the public key of the trading partners. The advan-
tage of using the Directory services is that the keys can be freely distributed 
in a networked environment. 
7.4.7 Message Loss 
Vulnerability to message loss is considered critical to an EDI application. The 
types of message loss can be distinguished as: 
• failure of the UA or MS 
• loss of individual message due to security violations 
As a result, the transfer of messages between responsibility domains requires 
protection for service providers in addition to that of end users. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter described the security services which are incorporated in the 
proposed model. The service, like authentication on a global basis, is realised 
with the use of X.500 standards. Also, the non-repudiation services, which are 
very important due to lack of a hard copy, can be effectively implemented by 
the use of digital signatures. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Further Work 
In this thesis, a model of the Direct Store Delivery System was proposed which 
can be implemented in a cost effective manner without compromising the se-
curity of the Electronic Data Interchange Systems. The security provided in 
the existing EDI systems were studied and a proposal was made to enhance 
the security in the present day EDI system which incorporated the enhanced 
security services like mutual authentication, non-repudiation, responsibility, 
user identification etc. 
The whole EDI transaction was divided into two distinct categories: 
• The conversion of the in-house application into an EDI format with 
the use of translation software. The security features provided in the 
UN/EDIFACT standard for structuring EDI messages are enhanced with 
the inclusion of the certificates and digital signature, without changing 
the syntax of the EDI format. Single or multiple messages level security 
can be incorporated in the model. Thus the security provided will de-
pend on whether a financial transaction or any general EDI transaction 
is taking place. 
• After the conversion into a standardized EDI format, the EDI messages 
needs to be communicated over a communications network. The inherent 
security problems in the network makes it necessary to have security 
while the data is in transit. Also in a distributed networked environment, 
reliable authentication between the communicating parties is necessary. 
In this model global authentication was provided by the use of X.509 
Directory Authentication framework and the whole transaction can be 
carried out in a message handling system. 
The third party service providers are responsible for the basic services of 
keeping the log of transactions, audit and other control functions. Also, they 
can act as a Certification Authority to keep the database of user information 
which can be freely communicated on a network. 
As a result of the security enhancements, the problems occurring in the 
the EDI systems like cross vulnerability, password guessing attacks, authen-
tications can be countered efficiently. In general, the following features are 
provided: 
• The Direct Store Delivery System is a straight forward model which pro-
vides a high degree of security in a cost effective manner. 
• It relieves the user from the burden of maintenance, upgradation of the 
system and expansion to other networks. 
• If the third party service providers have the provision of Directory ser-
vices and messaging handling systems, then the electronic transactions 
can be carried out globally with a reasonable degree of security. 
• Once the user authentication is complete, all the security features of the 
model will be transparent to the user. 
• In the model, we make no assumptions about the security of the under-
lying network. The data is transmitted in an encrypted form to ensure 
that even the third party cannot extract message enroute. 
8.1 Further Work 
The next step is to implement the Direct Store Delivery System by providing 
a Graphical User Interface (GUI) tool. In the current application, the model 
cannot be used in an interactive mode but this is not a major limitation. Sec-
ondly, the RSA public key cryptosystem is used for exchange of certificates 
and public keys. The RSA cryptosystem is slower than the conventional cryp-
tosystems, but as the application is not interactive, the computational time 
delay is not noticed by the user. 
The security features should protect all types of data. Future EDIs must 
be able to deal not only with standard business data but also with related data 
such as electrical and mechanical characteristics (CAD/CAM and test data). 
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Appendix A 
Security Enhanced Direct Store 
Delivery System 
Abstract 
Currently there is limited security provided in carrying out business using Elec-
tronic Data Interchange (EDI). The aim of this paper is to enhance the secu-
rity of the Direct Store Delivery System which is a special form of EDI. The 
whole communication process is carried out using a trusted third party service 
provider with a view to maximize the performance of the system. The model 
describes authenticity using X.500 recommendations, confidentiality and in-
tegrity using public key cryptography and provides a low cost solution to the 
existing system. The transactions are carried out in the UN/EDIFACT format 
using the X.435 standards. 
A. l Introduction 
The primary purpose of EDI is to provide communication standards that pro-
mote the interchange of common business information to facilitate the elec-
tronic linkages without human intervention. In recent years, both public and 
private sectors use EDI for trading purposes. The increasing use of EDI in 
financial transactions has made it necessary to consider network security in 
greater detail and enhance the security in these systems. The following issues 
need to be raised in view of security of the existing EDI systems [13 . 
• There is limited security in most of the present day EDI systems. They 
rely on passwords to access the system thus making it vulnerable to 
password guessing attacks. 
• As more and more business information is transmitted between computer 
systems, we need to protect these transactions from unauthorized viewing 
and/or alteration. Unauthorized viewing can provide competitive infor-
mation which may be undesirable to disclose. With the introduction of 
third parties and increased risk of unauthorized access to confidential 
information, there is a need to restructure the existing security features. 
• Generally, EDI systems work on a point to point basis or have a limited 
number of trading partners. The security and control features incorpo-
rated in the system are as strong as the weakest link in the EDI chain. 
A cross-vulnerability resulting from technical limitation can compromise 
the integrity of the dependent EDI systems. 
• Different security standards may create problems when trading partners 
are adhering to different standards. 
• The security features needs to be upgraded as the complexity grows. 
This paper describes security enhancement of the Direct Store Delivery 
System which uses a Trusted Third Party Service Provider or Value Added 
Network (VAN) over a network as shown in figure 1 with a view to maximize 
the performance of the system. It provides a low cost security solution to the 
existing EDI applications. We used X.500 standards based on the Directory 
Services for resolving the address issues and mutual authentication based on 
the principal global identity [15]. The whole transaction in the model was 
carried out using the UN/EDIFACT format of transactions. 
Section 2 provides the background on the concepts used in the model, 
section 3 describes the Direct Store Delivery System model and the security 
features provided and section 4 summarizes the paper with the gains in imple-
menting the model and scope for further work. 
A.2 Concepts and Mechanisms 
The primary goal of any system is to carry out transactions in an open and 
secure fashion either on a point to point basis or on a public data network. 
However, in networked and distributed environments, what particular users 
are allowed to do depends upon the security policies in effect. Within a single 
domain, where all processing nodes and network links are under the control 
of the same administration, security is not such a critical issue. However, 
when the transaction takes place between two separate domains and makes 
use of public data networks, security issues must be considered in great de-
tail. A trusted third party network provider provides some security functions 
like trusted key issuers, key-management facihties, user registration, notary 
services and security gateways. 
A.2.1 Security Issues 
The following are some of the network security issues which need to be con-
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Figure A.l: Direct Store Delivery System 
• Authentication 
Authentication is a process used to: 
- verify the identity of the sender of a message to the receiver in order 
to detect spoofing or impersonation. 
- verify the integrity of the message by detecting changes (modifica-
tions) in a message introduced between the sending and receiving 
process. 
- protect a unique message identifier used to detect attempts at in-
sertion, deletion or replay of messages. 
Most of the above threats can be countered by using strong authentica-
tion. In this, neither the entity which is authenticated nor any eaves-
dropper on the conversation can furnish the ability to impersonate the 
authenticating principal. There are some interception attacks which can-
not be countered by strong authentication only. Hence, additional data 
encryption is needed to secure the channel. The well known cryptosys-
tems are RSA [1] using public key techniques and DES, LOKI using 
symmetric key techniques. RSA is widely preferred algorithm for digital 
signatures as well as for authentication with secrecy. 
• Key Distribution and Management 
Secure methods of key management are extremely important. In prac-
tice, most attacks on the public key systems are probably aimed at the 
key management levels, rather than at the cryptographic algorithm it-
self. Users must obtain a key pair securely and efficiently suited to their 
security needs. In compliance with the CCITT X.500 standards the di-
rectories contain certificates as well as the public keys. Certificates are 
unforgeable. Hence it is difficult to impersonate another user. 
• Non-Repudiation of Origin and Receipt 
Non-repudiation of origin protects the recipient from the sender's denial 
of having ever sent the message, while non-repudiation of receipt protects 
the sender of the message from the receiver's denial of having received the 
message. Protection can be achieved by the sender including the digital 
signature with the message and the receiver sending the acknowledgment 
which contains the digital signature. In the protocol, the identity of -
the user is bound with the public key by digital signature by issuing 
certificates. The proof of delivery is done by the appropriate User Agent 
when it deceives the message. 
• Security Elements in EDI Messaging Structure 
The word envelope is used to represent different headers and trailers 
structured to form the EDI message as shown in figure 2. The UN/EDIFACT 
r Interchange Envelope Header(UNB) 
Functional Group Envelope Header(UNG) 
Message Header(UNH) 
^ Security Header(SEC) 
_ Security Trailer(RST) 
Message Trailer(RST) 
Functional Envelop Trailer(UNE) 
Interchange Envelop Trailer(UNZ) 
Figure A.2: U N / E D I F A C T message format 
standard provides the following features: 
- the employment of established security mechanisms 
- security services to be implemented by trading partners themselves, 
end to end and transparent to the underlying communication pro-
tocols, which may themselves provide security services 
- independence of and transparent to the communication medium 
used 
- an open standard which supports all existing security mechanisms 
- not involving changes to individual messages. A global approach 
is adopted which can be applied to any message irrespective of the 
business application. 
All security functions except the non-repudiation of receipt are provided 
by the inclusion of generic security header and trailer segments after the 
message header (UNH) and before the message trailer(UNT). If required 
a financial transactions can use more than one security envelopes. 
• Responsibility 
Another important feature that is incorporated is the responsibility for 
messages at each stage of the message path through the Message Han-
dling System environment [16]. Since a Trusted Third Party is used, the 
transfer of responsibihty is to be clearly identified and assured of further 
protectioji not only to the end users but also to the service provider. In 
the X.435 standard, the Responsibility Forwarded field is used to indi-
cate whether Responsibility was forwarded or not. When responsibility 
is accepted, the security elements are checked. 
• User Authorization and Access Control 
Authorization is an identity based access control for authorizing a partic-
ular user to carry out transactions. A simple way of doing this is to send 
the distinguished name and the password. The Directory will confirm 
whether the credentials are valid or not. The user is then notified ac-
cordingly. The proper functioning of the logical access control assists in 
preventing and detecting (by reporting security violations and attempts 
to access) unauthorized access to data. 
A.2.2 The Directory 
The Directory Services are required to support the security services within the 
message handling system and provide a name server. Typically, the MHS may 
access the Directory to determine the credentials of a user for the authentica-
tion process, identify the intended receiver and to resolve the address issues. 
The two basic entities of the Directory Service are the Directory User Agent 
and the Directory Service Agent. 
Each user's public key is stored in the Directory. A user wishing to have a 
secure exchange of messages with another user, obtains the other user's public 
key by using the Directory Services. He then uses this key within the required 
security service. The directory should be secured against tampering. Users are 
allowed to view and query the database and only the Certification Authority 
is allowed to modify an entry in the directory. 
The security services can be provided by different layers and different pro-
tocols dependi-tig on the application requirements. The approach is based on 
the following functions: 
• identification of the vulnerabilities of the system 
• definition of security services 
• placement of the security services in the particular protocol. 
A.3 The System Model 
The Direct Store Delivery System [10] is a chain of stores where ordering and 
deliveries are carried out centrally and the chain handles the distribution to 
the individual stores. It uses EDI to place bulk order with the suppliers telling 
them how much to deliver and when. Thus the retailers continue to get the 
benefit of centralized ordering and like the use of Just-In-Time stock man-
agement techniques, reduces inventory and saves on warehouse and material 
handling costs. The merchandise can be ordered faster and a given item is 
never out of stock. At the same time there is increased vulnerability to illegal 
access with the use of public data network and a trusted third party. 
The system consists of User Agent and Message Store in the messaging 
environment modeled as a functional object as shown in figure 3. The whole 
transaction process can be divided into independent processes: 
• Service Initiation —Initiation process starts with the retailer logging 
into the network through the access units User Agents. 
• Verification of Public key of the trading partner — T h e user can verify 
the public key of the trading partner from the database query and get 
the appropriate certificate from the directory database. 
• Generation of the Session key for transactions Once the authentication 
of the trading partners has taken place then they can generate a session 
key to encrypt the subsequent traffic on the association. 
• Trading : After completing all the above processes, the user can carry 












Figure-'A.3: Functional Model of Direct Store Delivery System 
box of the supplier who processes it and sends an appropriate response 
to the request. The auditing of the whole process is done by the third 
party and the user keeps a copy of the log of the transactions. 
The security requirements are related to the user's perceived threats and his as-
sessment of the cost of the security breach. Keeping this in view, the following 
generic security services are added to the Direct Store Delivery System. 
A.3.1 Basic Security Services 
The message consists of two parts, namely an Envelope and a Content. The En-
velope contains the necessary information for routing and delivering purposes 
and the Content contains the actual information which is to be transferred. 
User Authorization 
For using the services the user has first to identify his credentials to the server. 
Once the credentials are established, the user can use the services to either 
query the database or carry out other transactions. The user, after entering 
the name, is prompted for a password which consists of the user's name, a 
one-way hash of the password, a timestamp and a nonce which is returned to 
the user to be used. To prevent the hash of the password and the nonce from 
being intercepted over the network, they are encrypted using the public key of 
the CA. If the one way hash of the password from the database matches with 
that of the user, the CA returns the nonce encrypted with the public key of 
the originator. 
Key Management 
The RSA public key system is used to exchange the DES keys. The public key 
of the receiving User Agent is used to encrypt the DES key employed in the 
message encryption. The sending User Agent transfers this encrypted DES 
key to the receiving UA. The X.509 Directory Authentication framework is 
used for the authentication of the public keys of the users. 
Authentication Protocol 
As discussed earlier, the provision of the three services : Message Origin Au-
thentication, Content Integrity and Non-Repudiation of Origin are grouped 
together. 
The message-origin-authentication service is provided by the existence of 
message token which contains a signature which uniquely identifies the origin 
of the message. However, this does not guarantee that there has been no 
modification of the message. To achieve this, the content integrity check is 
included in the signed data part of the token. 
The receiver obtains the trusted copy of the pubhc key from the CA of the 
sender. If the CAs of the sender and the receiver are different, the receiver 
uses the certification path that has been supphed as part of the originator's 
certificate, to determine the copy of the receiver CA's public key. Using this, 
the receiver validates the signature on the originator's certificate. 
The Protocol 
The protocol is a slight modification of the existing X.509 Directory mutual 
authentication protocol [6 . 
step 1 
The exchange between the two parties A and B with A sending message to the 
Authentication Server AS ( in this application the Third Party) to find the 
public key of B [2]. This is done by looking into the database of the Directory. 
A A5 : A.B 
102 
Step 2, 
AS A: D1.D2 
where D^ = A.kl.h.t2) 
are timestamps, ¿2,4 are the lifetime of the corresponding keys and . in-
dicates concatenation. In order to sign data, the user applies a one-way hash 
function to the data followed by his digital signature (private transformation) 
D. The timestamps are needed to guard against the replay attack [3]. An in-
truder is not able to replace the messages in the previous steps since he does 
not have the secret key of the AS. 
Step 3. 
A^ B : Di.RA.B.datal.E{kl,datal).D{kl, 
h{RA.B.datalE{kl,datal))) 
where R^ is nonce chosen by A, /i is strong one way hash function, data\ is 
the plaintext data which they sign to preserve the integrity and data?̂  is the 
secret data to be exchanged between the two principals A and B. 
step 4-
B ^ A: RB-A.RA.datalE{kP,datal). 
D{kl.h{RB.A.RA.datal.E(kl,datal))) 
where Rb is nonce generated by B, data] is the plaintext data and datal is the 
secret data to be exchanged. 
step 5. 
A^B-.RB.D[kl.h{RB.B)) 
Thus at the end of the protocol, both the users are convinced that they are 
communicating with the right person. The above authentication process safe-
guards the integrity as well as confidentiality of the message. The users can 
then generate a session key which is used to encrypt the subsequent traffic on 
the association. 
Non-Repudiation of Delivery 
The sender of tiie message requests this service from the receiver by including 
a proof-of-delivery-request flag as a part of the signed-data in the message 
token to the receiver. The proof-of-delivery is computed as a signature on the 
unencrypted mess age-content and the various other parameters. The receiver 
then returns the proof-of-delivery, together with his certificate, to the sender 
of the message. 
Access Control Mechanisms 
In this paper we will consider the access control between a User Agent and its 
corresponding Message Store. This is achieved by using another type of token 
called a bind-token which is exchanged between the UA and the MS at the 
time of connection initiation. The token includes information as signed data 
and time which is checked by the MS to determine if it is valid. The token 
signature is computed using the UA's secret RSA key. The MS then returns 
the token to the UA which makes further checks and if all these checks are 
satisfied, then the connection can be estabhshed. The token from the MS to 
the UA is signed which implies that the MS needs to have its own RSA pair 
9, 17 . 
Message Loss 
Vulnerability to the message loss is considered critical to the EDI application. 
The types of message loss can be distinguished as : 
• failure of the UA or MS 
• loss of individual message due to security violations. 
So the transfer of messages between responsibility domains requires protection 
for service providers in addition to that of end users. 
A. 4 Summary 
This paper specifies a model for a secure direct store delivery system. It is 
straightforward model which provides a high degree of security in a cost effec-
tive manner and has many desirable features. Particularly, if the third party 
provides the directory services, then electronic transactions can be carried out 
with a reasonable degree of security over the network. It relieves the user from 
burden of maintenance, upgradation of the system and expansion to other 
networks. Furthermore, once the user authentication is complete, all security 
features of the direct store delivery system will be transparent to the user. 
The system makes no assumptions about the reliability of the underlying 
network. The data is transmitted in an encrypted form to ensure that even 
a third party cannot extract any information enroute. For this appropriate 
end-to-end encryption must be provided to counter traffic analysis. 
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